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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order issued by the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") 
District Court denying a Motion to File a Late Notice of Claim and Motion to Set Aside the 
Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order for Basin 37 filed by Appellants Gary and Glenna 
Eden ("the Edens"). 1 The Edens seek to file a Late Notice of Claim for water right no. 37-864, 
which was not claimed during the pendency of the SRBA and was, therefore, was decreed 
disallowed. The Edens allege that the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order should be set 
aside because the Edens did not receive sufficient notice of the SRBA proceedings to satisfy due 
process. The State ofldaho ("State") filed an objection to the motions, asserting that the Edens 
received sufficient notice of the SRBA and procedures for filing claims and that the Edens failed 
to show circumstances that warranted undermining the finality of the Final Unified Decree, upon 
which all water users in the Snake River Basin rely. The District Court agreed and denied the 
Edens' motions. The Edens appealed. 
B. Procedural Background 
"On November 19, 1987, the District Court for the County of Twin Falls issued an order 
commencing a general adjudication of water rights from the Snake River Basin water system in 
Idaho." R. Vol. I, p. 715. This general adjudication was to "result in a decree determining all 
water rights from the [Snake River Basin] water system." Id. This decree would then allow for 
the creation of "an accurate schedule of water rights to assure the proper delivery of water in 
times of shortage." Id. 
1 R. Vol. I, pp. 110-13 (Order Closing Claims Taking Basins OJ, 02, 03, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 
45, 47, and 63, and Disallowal of Unclaimed Water Rights (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter "Closure 
Order"]), 933-947 (Final Unified Decree (August 26, 2014)). 
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When the Legislature decided to initiate the SRBA, "no reasonable method of initiating 
the proceeding, [ and] providing notice to potential claimants ... was provided by the existing 
Rules of Civil Procedure." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,255,912 P.2d 614,623 
(1995) [hereinafter "Basin-Wide Issue 3"]. "[I]n light of the absence of applicable Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it was necessary for the Legislature to provide special procedural rules for the 
initiation of the SRBA." Id. The Legislature set forth such procedures in chapter 14, title 42, 
Idaho Code. 
One of the primary difficulties in a general stream adjudication like the SRBA is "the 
sheer multitude of the parties to the adjudication" which makes "personal service ... too 
onerous, impractical and confusing in its employment, defeating any purpose for meaningful 
notice." LU Ranching Co. v. United States, 138 Idaho 606,610, 67 P.3d 85, 89 (2003) (quoting 
In re Rights to the Use of Gila River, 830 P.2d 442, 453 (Ariz. 1992)). To deal with this issue, 
the Legislature developed the first and second-round service procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 
42-1408. 
Upon the commencement of the SRBA, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources ("IDWR") prepared the first-round service commencement notice to inform potential 
claimants of the commencement of the SRBA and the procedures for filing notices of claims. 
See Idaho Code§ 42-1408(1).2 The notice was specifically required to inform potential 
claimants: 
section 42-1409, Idaho Code, requires in a general adjudication all claimants, 
except those as specifically excluded by law, to file for each water right a notice 
of claim on a form furnished by the Director; failure to file a required notice of 
claim will result in a court determination that no water rights exists for the use of 
water for which the required notice of claim was not filed; 
2 A copy of the first-round service commencement notice mailed out in Lincoln County, Idaho is 
in the Record at pages 715 through 718. 
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Idaho Code§ 42-1408(1)(c). 
Under Idaho Code § 42-1408(2), this first-round service commencement notice was 
required to be circulated throughout the Snake River Basin by being published in a newspaper of 
general circulation in each county that was a part of the water system and posted in each county 
courthouse, recorder's office, and assessor's office. Additionally, the first-round service 
commencement notice was mailed to "each person listed as owning real property on the real 
property assessment roll within the boundaries of the water system to be adjudicated at the 
address listed on the real property assessment roll." Idaho Code§ 42-1408(2)(d). 
The Director was then required to circulate a second-round service commencement notice 
upon the expiration of the period for filing notices of claims in each water basin. Idaho Code § 
42-1408( 4). In preparing the second-round service commencement notice, the Director was to 
compare the notices of claims filed in the SRBA with IDWR's records "to determine whether 
there are any rights to water from the water system for which no notice of claim was filed." Id. 
Then, the Director was to dete1mine the owner of the land for which possibly unclaimed rights 
are appurtenant and serve such persons with a second-round service commencement notice 
including the same information required for first-round service along with "a final date for filing 
notices of claims." 3 Id. "Any person who fails to submit a required notice of claim shall be 
deemed to have been constructively served with notice of a general adjudication by publication 
and mailing as required by section 42-1408, Idaho Code." Idaho Code§ 42-1409(5). 
The Edens personally received both first and second-round service. R. Vol. I, pp. 710-
714, 757-58 (Affidavit of Service of Commencement Notice -Lincoln County (Sept. 20, 1988) 
(listing Gary and Glenna Eden as persons mailed the first-round service commencement notice 
3 A copy of the second-round service commencement notice mailed out in Basin 37, Paii 1, is 
included in the Record at pages 219 through 222. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 3 
on March 28, 1988)); R. Vol. I, pp. 215-17, 223 (Affidavit of Danni M Smith Re: Second Round 
Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1 (June 1, 2005) (listing Gary and Glenna 
Eden as persons mailed, by certified mail, the second-round service commencement notice on 
May 5, 2005)); R. Vol. I, p. 228 (return receipt for certified mail signed by Glenna Eden on May 
6, 2005). 
After the commencement of the SRBA, the Court issued a "Supplemental Order Granting 
Additional Powers to District Judge," which gave the SRBA District Court "the authority and 
power to modify the procedure for making service of pleadings, motions, notices of hearing and 
other documents ... " Basin-Wide Issue 3, 128 Idaho at 251, 912 P.2d at 619. In response to that 
order, the SRBA District Court issued SRBA Administrative Order 1, Rules of Procedure 
(amended Oct. 16, 1997) [hereinafter "AOJ"]. Id; R. Vol. I, pp. 867-923. 
Personal service of all filings in the SRBA could not practicably be made on all claimants 
or interested persons. See LU Ranching, 138 Idaho at 610, 67 P.3d at 89. To keep interested 
persons apprised of the proceedings in the SRBA, the SRBA District Court instituted the Docket 
Sheet Procedure set forth inAOJ § 6. See R. Vol. I, p. 877 (AOJ §2(h)) (defining "Docket Sheet 
Procedure" as "[t]he procedure established to give notice of proceedings on non-subcase matters 
to SRBA claimants and parties."). 
Docket Sheets are issued by the SRBA District Court monthly and include a list of all 
orders, pleadings ( except responses, pleadings or, orders filed in subcases ), and other documents 
filed with or issued by the SRBA District Court since the last Docket Sheet.4 R. Vol. I, p. 886 
(AOJ § 6(b)). Pursuant to AOJ § 6(c), a copy of the Docket Sheet is posted in the district court 
4 The Docket Sheet also separately lists upcoming hearings, all objections and responses filed, 
Special Master Reports and Recommendations issued, Amended Director's Reports, and all 
partial decrees issued since the last Docket Sheet. R. Vol. I, p. 886 (AOJ § 6(b)). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 4 
of each county within the SRBA boundaries and is made available at IDWR's central and 
regional offices. 5 R. Vol. I, p. 887. Additionally, interested persons have the option of paying a 
minimal annual fee to subscribe to the Docket Sheet. Id. (AOJ § 6(d)); see also LU Ranching, 
138 Idaho at 610, 67 P.3d at 89 ("AOl (6)(d) allows one to subscribe to the SRBA docket sheet 
for a nominal fee."). "Compliance with the Docket Sheet Procedure constitutes notice to all 
parties to the adjudication." R. Vol. I, p. 888 (AOJ § 6(f)(3)(b)). 
As the SRBA was winding down, the District Court began issuing orders informing water 
users that it would start closing claims taking in specific water basins. See, e.g., R. Vol. I, pp. 5-
8 (Order Establishing Deadline for Late Claim Filings in Basins 01, 02, 03, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 
41, 45, 47, and 63 (Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter "Deadline Order"]). Closing claims taking in 
individual basins was "an essential first step to completion of the SRBA. Without it, completion 
of the SRBA will not occur." R. Vol. I, p. 6. Notice of the completion of claims taking was not 
required under chapter 14, title 42, Idaho Code, but was given as an additional courtesy to water 
users. R. Vol. I, p. 7. 
The Deadline Order was issued in October 2012, and stated that "the last date to file a 
MOTION TO FILE LATE CLAIM in [Basin 37] shall be January 31, 2013. No late claims will 
be accepted for filing in [Basin 3 7] after January 31, 2013." R. Vol. I, pp. 5, 8. The Deadline 
Order stated that claimants "previously received extensive first-round and second-round Notice 
of Filing Requirements in the SRBA" and "there is limited subcase activity in these basins. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that it is appropriate to begin the basin closure process." R. Vol. I, 
pp. 6-7. 
5 The Docket Sheet is also posted on the SRBA website. See 
http://www.srba.state.id. us/DOCSHT .HTM. 
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Attached to the Deadline Order as Exhibit 1 was "a list of non-de minimis water rights 
from IDWR's water rights database" for which "IDWR is unable to ascertain ... that a claim has 
been filed in the SRBA." R. Vol. I, p. 7. The Deadline Order admonished potential claimants to 
"examine Exhibit 1 to determine whether the listed water right numbers are active water rights. 
The burden of determining whether to file a motion for late claim for any of the listed water right 
numbers rests solely with the water right holder." Id. The Deadline Order further provided that 
"[i]f unclaimed, these water rights will be decreed as disallowed." Id. Water right no. 37-864 
was listed in Exhibit 1 as an unclaimed water right.6 R. Vol. I, pp. 17, 54. Notice of the issuance 
of the Deadline Order was served via the Docket Sheet Procedures inAOI § 6. R. Vol. I, p. 
1147. 
The Closure Order for Basin 37 was issued on February 13, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 110. The 
Closure Order reiterated that the Deadline Order informed claimants that the last date to file a 
Motion to File Late Claim in Basin 3 7 was January 31, 2013, and that water rights listed in 
Exhibit 1 would be decreed disallowed if unclaimed. R. Vol. I, p. 111. The Closure Order then 
officially ordered the closing of claims taking in Basin 3 7, with a few exceptions not applicable 
here, and ordered that "all unclaimed water rights represented by the water right numbers listed 
on Exhibit 1 ... are hereby decreed as disallowed." R. Vol. I, pp. 112-13. Water right no. 37-
864 was included in Exhibit 1 and expressly decreed disallowed in the Closure Order. 7 R. Vol. 
6 Water right no. 37-864 appeared on page 4 of 16 of the subsection of Exhibit 1 labeled "Basin 
37 Potentially Unclaimed Water Rights." R. Vol. I, pp. 51, 54. The entry for the water right 
stated that it was sourced from the Big Wood River for irrigation, it was based on a decree, and 
the owner ofrecord was Anthony M. Gomes. R. Vol. I, p. 54. 
7 Like in the Deadline Order, water right no. 37-864 appeared on page 4 of 16 of the subsection 
of Exhibit 1 labeled "Basin 37 Potentially Unclaimed Water Rights." R. Vol. I, pp. 147, 150. 
The entry for the water right stated that it was sourced from the Big Wood River for irrigation, it 
was based on a decree, and the owner of record was Anthony M. Gomes. R. Vol. I, p 150. 
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I, p. 150. Notice of the issuance of the Closure Order was also served via the Docket Sheet 
Procedures inAOJ § 6. R. Vol. I, p. 1168. 
On August 26, 2014, almost twenty-seven years after the commencement of the SRBA, 
the District Court issued the Final Unified Decree.8 R. Vol. I, p. 933. The Final Unified Decree 
decrees more than 158,600 water rights. Ann Y. Vonde et al., Understanding the Snake River 
Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 53, 56 (2016). With few exceptions, this decree is 
"conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water rights within the Snake River Basin within 
the State ofldaho with a priority date prior to November 19, 1987" and "is binding against all 
persons." R. Vol. I, pp. 941,943; Idaho Code§ 42-1420(1). "All prior water right decrees and 
general provisions within the Snake River Basin water system are superseded by this Final 
Unified Decree except as expressly provided otherwise by partial decree or general provision of 
th[ e] Court." R. Vol. I, p. 944. Incorporated into the Final Unified Decree is Attachment 6 
which sets forth "water rights of record with the Idaho Department of Water Resources that were 
required to be claimed but were not claimed in this proceeding and therefore were decreed 
disallowed." R. Vol. I, p. 943. Water right no. 37-864 is included in Attachment 6 as an 
unclaimed water right expressly decreed disallowed. R. Vol. I, p. 956. 
Although the District Court would regularly grant motions to file late claims prior to 
closure orders being issued, late claims have not been permitted after the entry of the Final 
Unified Decree.9 See Vonde, Understanding the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO L. 
8 Idaho Code§ 42-1412(8) directs that "[u]pon resolution of all objections to water rights 
acquired under state law, to water rights established under federal law, and to general provisions, 
and after entry of partial decree(s ), the district court shall combine all partial decrees and the 
general provisions into a final decree." 
9 On appeal, the Edens allege that their motion to file a late claim was "consistent with 
precedent, including in recent months, for individual SRBA water right Partial Decrees to be 
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REV. at 68-69; R. Vol. I, p. 382-83. On September 30, 2016, over two years after the entry of 
the Final Unified Decree, the Edens filed the current Motion to File a Late Claim and Motion to 
Set Aside the Final Unified Decree and Closure Order. R. Vol. I, pp. 245-271. The Edens 
alleged that the Final Unified Decree and Closure Order should be set aside either under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure ("LR. C.P. ") 60(b )( 4) because the Edens did not receive sufficient notice 
and an opportunity to be heard or under I.R. C.P. 60(b )( 6) because their situation presents unique 
and compelling circumstances justifying relief. R. Vol. I, pp. 265-68. 
On October 14, 2016, the State filed a response to the Edens' motions. R. Vol. I, p. 333. 
The State argued that the Edens received sufficient notice of the need to file a claim for water 
right no. 37-864 in the form of first and second-round service as well as the District Court's 
issuance of the Deadline Order, listing water right no. 37-864 as an unclaimed right. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 339-41. Additionally, the State argued that the Edens failed to show unique and compelling 
circumstances that warranted setting aside the Final Unified Decree and disrupting the finality of 
the over 158,600 water rights incorporated therein. R. Vol. I, pp. 342-48. 
A hearing was held on the Edens' motions on October 27, 2016. R. Vol. I, pp. 372-73. 
On November 8, 2016, the District Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside; Order 
Denying Motion to File Late Claim ("Order"). R. Vol. I, pp. 375-84. The Edens appealed. R. 
Vol. I, pp. 385-91. 
periodically opened for correction or amendment, without impacting other aspects of the SRBA 
Final Unified Decree." Appellants' Br. at 9. In support of this argument, the Edens point to the 
SRBA Docket Sheets for October, November, and December 2016. Id. (citing R. Vol. I, pp. 
1191, 1204, 1206, 1212). The proceedings referenced by the Edens were situations where the 
District Court acted to correct clerical errors in partial decrees under I.R.C.P. 60(a), after such 
errors were identified by IDWR. See R. Vol. I, pp. 1191, 1204, 1206, 1212. This does not 
establish precedent for persons to move to set aside the Final Unified Decree under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) in order to file a late notice of claim. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
The Edens' Late Notice of Claim for water right no. 37-864 asserts a right to divert 1.00 
cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water from the Big Wood River to irrigate 40 acres in Lincoln 
County, Idaho, that the Edens purchased in 1992. R. Vol. I, pp. 251-52, 256. The claim is 
allegedly based on a prior decree and seeks a priority date of September 28, 1896. R. Vol. I, pp. 
251, 253-255. This water right was not claimed during the pendency of the SRBA and was, 
therefore, decreed disallowed. 
Water right no. 37-864 was not the Edens only water interest in the Snake River Basin. 
The Edens own at least one other water right that was properly claimed in the SRBA, water right 
no. 37-10953. R. Vol. I, pp. 316-17. The Edens received a partial decree for water right no. 37-
10953 in 2002. R. Vol. I, p. 709. 
The Edens' Motion to Set Aside focused on events that occurred in April and May of 
2005. The Edens alleged that on April 28, 2005, they received a letter from IDWR asking the 
Edens to confirm their mailing address had changed. 10 R. Vol. I, p. 214. A few weeks later, on 
May 6, 2005, the Edens received the Second-Round Service Commencement Notice for Basin 37, 
Part 1 [hereinafter "Second-Round Service Notice"]. R. Vol. I, pp. 215-221, 223,228. It was 
undisputed in the proceeding before the District Court that the Edens, in fact, received the 
Second-Round Service Notice included in the Record at pages 219 through 222. 11 
The Second-Round Service Notice informed the Edens that they may own a water right in 
the Snake River Basin for which a claim had not been filed in the SRBA. R. Vol. I, p. 219. 
10 This letter referred to "Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) Notices of Claim to a Water 
Right #37-365, 37-366 and 37-367B and Decrees #37-10322 and 10953." R. Vol. I, p. 214. 
IDWR's records indicate that notice of claims were filed for the above water rights in the SRBA 
by the Edens' predecessors in interest and ownership of those claims was transferred to the 
Edens. R. Vol. I, pp. 308-319. 
11 See infra Section V .A. l .i, pp. 15-17. 
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Additionally, the Second-Round Service Notice clearly stated: "FAILURE TO FILE A 
REQUIRED NOTICE OF CLAIM WILL RESULT IN A DETERMINATION BY THE 
COURT THAT THE WATER RIGHT NO LONGER EXISTS." Id. 
As required by Idaho Code § 42-1408( 4), the Second-Round Service Notice also provided 
the Edens with instructions for filing a notice of claim in the SRBA, including that "Notices of 
Claims must be filed on forms prepared by IDWR or a reasonable facsimile" and that failure to 
include the required filing fee would "result in a rejection of the Notice of Claim." R. Vol. I, pp. 
220-21. These requirements reflect the requirements for filing notices of claims set forth in 
chapter 14, title 42 Idaho Code. See Idaho Code§§ 42-1409, 42-1414. 
According to the Edens' Motion to Set Aside, the Second-Round Service Notice 
prompted the Edens to attempt to claim water right no. 37-864 in the SRBA. R. Vol. I, p. 261. 
The Edens, however, did not obtain and file a notice of claim form. Rather, "[a]long with 
returning the signed April 28, 2005, address change letter to IDWR, and apparently in response 
to the recently received Second Round Service Notice, the Edens also enclosed documentation 
attempting to claim Water Right No. 37-864 in the SRBA." R. Vol. I, p. 261; see also R. Vol. I, 
p. 229. The Edens offered no evidence in this proceeding as to what "documentation" they 
allegedly enclosed with the change of address letter. Tr. Vol. I, p. 19 L. 22-p. 20 L. 19. The 
Edens did not include the required filing fee. Tr. Vol. I, p. 13 Ls. 10-17; R. Vol. I, p. 229. 
The Record includes a copy of an unsigned letter allegedly drafted by an IDWR 
employee. R. Vol. I, p. 229. The letter stated that IDWR received the signed address change 
letter and further provides: "I gathered from the enclosures you sent me that you would like to 
file a claim on 37-864. I have enclosed a claim form with instructions for your possible use. 
The filing fee is $50.00 and the late fee is $50.00." Id. It is unclear if the letter was ever sent. 
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Tr. Vol. I, p. 12 Ls. 10-17, p. 13 Ls. 19-21. The Edens allege that they never received the letter. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. 
The Edens stated that because they received no response from IDWR, they believed they 
had adequately filed a claim. R. Vol. I, pp. 231,239. The Edens alleged that they did not know 
of an issue until 2016 when a director of the Big Wood Canal Company informed them that they 
would not be receiving storage water supplemental to water right no. 37-864. R. Vol. I, pp. 231, 
261-62. The Edens received a letter from the Treasurer/Secretary for Water District 37, dated 
March 20, 2015. R. Vol. I, p. 356. The letter states, "it has come to our attention that Water 
Right 37-864 was disallowed in the states [sic] adjudication process." Id. The letter also states 
that IDWR "records show the water right in the name of Anthony M. Gomez [sic]. Water Right 
37-864 had not been transferred to your ownership." Id. The Edens filed the Motion to Set 
Aside and Motion to File a Late Notice of Claim for water right no. 37-864 on September 30, 
2016. R. Vol. I, pp. 245,259. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying the Edens' Motion to Set 
Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
a. Whether there was substantial evidence on the record to support the District 
Court's finding that the Edens received second-round service. 
b. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the Edens' belief that they properly 
filed a claim for water right no. 37-864 was umeasonable. 
c. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that due process did not require that the 
Edens be personally served with three-days' notice of the Closure Order. 
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying the Edens' Motion to Set 
Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 
3. Whether the District Court erred in denying the Edens' Motion to File a Late Notice of 
Claim. 
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III. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the State is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. 
IV. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
A district court's decision to grant or deny relief from a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 
850,380 P.3d 168, 171 (2016). The district court's decision will be upheld if it "(1) correctly 
perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its determination through an 
exercise ofreason." Waller v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,237, 192 P.3d 
1058, 1061 (2008). "If the trial court applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth 
in Rule 60(b ), while keeping in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will 
be deemed to have acted within its discretion." Id. at 238, 192 P.3d at 1062 (citation omitted). 
"A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined by 
the trial court." Id. at 237, 192 P.3d at 1061 (citation omitted). "Those factual findings will be 
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. at 238, 192 P.3d at 1062. "[A] factual finding will 
not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is 
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State, Dep 't of Health & 
Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho 18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003). "[C]lear error will not be deemed to 
exist if the findings are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence." 
Id. 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court exercises free review 
over questions oflaw." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,287,221 P.3d 81, 85 (2009) (quoting 
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Kootenai Med. Ctr. v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 872,876,216 P.3d 630, 634 
(2009)). 
V. ARGUMENT 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b ); 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
misconduct by an opposing party; 
( 4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an 
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is 
no longer equitable; or 
( 6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
"Although courts have broad discretion in granting or denying such motions, that discretion is 
bounded by the requirement that the party seeking relief demonstrate 'unique and compelling 
circumstances' which justify relief." Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724,726,274 P.3d 589, 
591 (2011) (quoting Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996)). 
Additionally, "[i]t is incumbent upon a party seeking relief from a judgment not only to 
meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b), but also to show, plead or present evidence of facts 
which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action." Id. ( citation 
omitted). "This policy recognizes that it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial 
resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there is no genuine justiciable 
controversy." Id. (citation omitted). 
A motion under Rule 60(b) must also be timely. "A motion under Rule 60(b) must be 
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than 6 months after the 
entry of judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." I.R.C.P. 60(c)(l). The Edens 
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requested relief from the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order under Rule 60(b)(4) and 
Rule 60(b)(6). R. Vol. I, pp. 259-71. 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Edens' 
Motion to Set Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order Under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). 
To grant a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), the District Court would have had to conclude 
that both the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order were void. "Generally, the [c]ourt 
may declare a judgment void only for defects of personal jurisdiction or subject-matter 
jurisdiction." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 291,221 P.3d at 89. "However, a judgment is also void if 
the 'court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due 
process."' Id. ( quoting Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P .3d 321, 
325 (2004)). The Edens did not challenge the District Court's personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction, but instead argued that their right to due process was violated. R. Vol. I, pp. 265-
67. 
"Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that the 
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal 
constitutions." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 291,221 P.3d at 89 (quoting Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 
143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006)). "[A]n individual must be provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kootenai Cty., 145 Idaho 448, 
454, 180 P.3d 487,493 (2008)). Importantly, "[d]ue process is not a rigid concept. Instead, the 
protections and safeguards necessarily vary according to the situation." Id. at 292, 221 P.3d at 
90. 
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1. The Edens' Arguments That They Did Not Receive Second-Round 
Service and That the Affidavit of Second-Round Service Did Not Meet 
Statutory Requirements Were Not Raised at the District Court and Are, 
Therefore, Waived. 
The Edens agree with the District Court's conclusion that that the first and second-round 
notice procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 42-1408 meet constitutional due process 
requirements. Appellants' Br. at 20 ( citing LU Ranching Co. v. United States, 13 8 Idaho 606, 
608-10, 67 P.3d 85, 87-89 (2003)); R. Vol. I, p. 377. On appeal, the Edens allege, however, that 
there was not substantial evidence to support the District Court's finding that the Edens, in fact, 
received second-round service in May 2005. Appellants' Br. at 4-6, 16-22. The Edens also 
appear to argue that the second-round service circulated in Basin 37 was insufficient because the 
affidavit of second-round service for Basin 37, Part 1, filed with the District Court on June 1, 
2005, did not meet the requirements ofldaho Code§ 42-1408(5). Id. at 16-22. These 
arguments were never raised before the District Court. Moreover, these allegations are 
inapposite to the factual allegations made by the Edens before the District Court in support of 
their motions. 
1. It Was Undisputed in the Proceeding Before the District Court That 
the Edens Received Second-Round Service. 
The Edens Motion to Set Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order alleged 
that "in early May 2005, the Edens received the SRBA Second Round Service Notice, likely due 
to their ownership of the place of use associated with unclaimed Water Right No. 37-864." R. 
Vol. I, p. 261 (emphasis added). The Edens further alleged that "in response to the recently 
received Second Round Service Notice, the Edens also enclosed [ with the change of address 
form] documentation attempting to claim Water Right No. 37-864 in the SRBA." Id. (emphasis 
added). The legal theories advanced by the Edens at the District Court for setting aside the Final 
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Unified Decree and the Closure Order were prefaced on the Edens, in fact, receiving second-
round service: 
Without a response, the Edens believed IDWR had accepted their submission and 
that it was adequate ... This belief was reasonable in view oftheir receipt of the 
Second Round Service Notice, stating that, "Assistance in filing Notices of Claims 
filed in this adjudication may be obtained at all offices ofIDWR' "and that 
Notices of Claims must be filed on forms prepared by IDWR or a reasonable 
facsimile." Affidavit of Dana Hofstetter, Exhibit 2, at Exhibit B, p. 3 (emphasis 
added). Having received Second Round Service and then complying by 
contacting IDWR to claim 37-864, the Edens effectively were denied their due 
process notice and hearing opportunities with respect to 37-864 when IDWR used 
the incorrect address for the May 19, 2005 response letter. 
R. Vol. I, p. 266 ( emphasis added). 
In support of their motions, the Edens filed the Affidavit of Dana L. Hofstetter 
("Hofstetter Affidavit") with attached exhibits. R. Vol. I, pp. 206-29. The Hofstetter Affidavit 
stated: 
Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of Affidavit of Danni M 
Smith Re: Second Round Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 3 7, Part 1, 
filed with the SRBA Court on June 1, 2005. I obtained this copy of Exhibit 2 
from IDWR. Attached as Exhibits A and B to this document (but unmarked in 
this version) are copies of respectively the Second Round Service 
Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1 and the service list for Second Round 
Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 3 7, Part 1. The first page of Exhibit 
B to the Affidavit of Danni M Smith, indicates inter alia that on May 5, 2005, 
Gary T. and Glenna Eden were mailed Second Round Service of Commencement 
Notice for Basin 3 7, Part 1 at the correct mailing address they had confirmed by 
return of the April 28, 2005 letter ... 
R. Vol. I, p. 207. 
The Affidavit of Danni M Smith Re: Second Round Service of Commencement Notice for 
Basin 37, Part 1 ("Smith Affidavit") including Exhibits A and B that the Edens filed in support of 
their motions is included in the Record at pages 215 through 227. Also attached to the Hofstetter 
Affidavit as Exhibit 3 was "a true and correct copy of the certified return receipt signed by 
Glenna Eden on May 6, 2005, that [Ms. Hofstetter] obtained from IDWR." R. Vol. I, pp. 207, 
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228. It was undisputed in the proceeding before the District Court that the Second-Round 
Service Notice attached as Exhibit A to the Smith Affidavit filed by the Edens was the notice the 
Edens received in May 2005. See R. Vol. I, pp. 207,266. 
At the hearing before the District Court, the Edens' counsel continued to represent that 
the Edens received second-round service and continued to rely on the Second Round Service 
Notice attached as Exhibit A to the Smith Affidavit in arguing the Edens' motions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 9 
Ls. 10-24, p. 10 Ls. 11-18, p. 11 Ls. 15-20, p. 19 Ls. 9-21, p. 21 Ls. 1-6. In fact, at the 
hearing, the Edens' counsel referred to blown up pages from the Second Round Service Notice to 
emphasize language that the Edens argued led them to believe that filing documentation with a 
change of address form was sufficient to file a claim in the SRBA. Tr. Vol. I, p. 14 Ls. 18-24. 
The District Court also specifically asked the Edens' counsel whether the Edens were arguing 
that they did not receive notice or that the notice they received was defective. Tr. Vol. I, p. 17 
Ls. 19-22. In response, counsel for the Edens stated: "Okay. So I want to make it absolutely 
clear we're not contesting whether they received second round service notice. We agree they 
received that. We're not challenging the content of the second round service and it's [sic] 
adequacy." Tr. Vol. I, p. 19 Ls. 9-13. 
It was uncontested in the proceeding before the District Court that the Edens received the 
Second-Round Service Notice attached as Exhibit A to the Smith Affidavit. In fact, it was the 
Edens who introduced the Smith Affidavit and the Second-Round Service Notice into evidence in 
the proceeding before the District Court. The District Court, therefore, did not error in finding 
that "in early May 2005, the Movants received second round service notice of the 
commencement of the SRBA." R. Vol. I, p. 376. As the District Court correctly concluded, that 
fact was undisputed. R. Vol. I, p. 378. 
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11. Whether the Affidavit of Second-Round Service for Basin 37, Part 1 
Met the Requirements ofldaho Code§ 42-1408(5) Is a New Legal 
Theory Raised for the First Time on Appeal. 
On appeal, the Edens for the first time allege that the affidavit of second-round service 
for Basin 37, Part 1, filed with the District Court on June 1, 2005, did not comply with Idaho 
Code§ 42-1408(5). Appellants' Br. at 16-22. In support of this argument, the Edens rely on the 
Smith Affidavit included in the Record at pages 924 through 932. 
The Record on Appeal includes two copies of the Smith Affidavit. The Smith Affidavit on 
pages 215 through 227 is the Smith Affidavit that Ms. Hofstetter obtained from IDWR's records, 
that was filed in SRBA subcase 37-864 by the Edens, and was before the District Court when it 
ruled on the Edens' motions. See R. Vol. I, p. 207. The Smith Affidavit on pages 924 through 
932 is the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA main case (case no. 00-39576) that IDWR allegedly 
filed on June 1, 2005. 12 In their Notice of Appeal, the Edens requested the inclusion of the Smith 
Affidavit from the SRBA main case file in the Record on Appeal. R. Vol. I, p. 387. This copy of 
the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA main case records was not presented in the subcase below or 
considered by the District Court in ruling on the Edens' motions. 
On appeal, the Edens for the first time allege that the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA 
main case file is insufficient because it is missing Exhibit A (the Second-Round Service 
Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1). Appellants' Br. at 16-22. The Edens state in their 
briefing that the alleged discrepancy between the Smith Affidavit in the SRBA main case file and 
the Smith Affidavit from IDWR's records was not discovered by the Edens until they were served 
with the record in this appeal. Id. at 17 n.3. 
12 As this issue has not been raised until on appeal, the State has not had an opportunity to 
investigate this issue and whether the Smith Affidavit currently on record in the SRBA main case 
is representative of what IDWR actually filed on June 1, 2005. 
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The version of the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA main case was never filed in SRBA 
subcase no. 37-864. Nor was any potential discrepancy between the Smith Affidavit on file with 
ID WR-which was filed in this subcase-and the Smith Affidavit from SRBA main case records 
raised in the proceeding before the District Court on the Edens' motions. As this Court recently 
reiterated, "[ a ]n appellant is bound by the issues and theories upon which the case was tried 
below. Although a judgment may be sustained upon any legal theory, a new theory cannot be 
employed on appeal to attack the judgment." Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 47, 394 P.3d 87, 90 
(2017) (quoting Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185,207, 814 P.2d 917, 939 
(1991)). The Edens' argument that the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order for Basin 37 
should be set aside because the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA main case file is missing pages 
cannot be employed to attack the District Court's Order. 
Additionally, even if the argument was not waived, it would not support a conclusion that 
the Final Unified Decree and Closure Order for Basin 37 should be set aside because the Edens 
did not receive due process. The Smith Affidavit from the SRBA main case records appears to be 
missing Exhibit A (The Second Round Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 3 7, Part 1 ). 
Compare R. Vol. I, pp. 215-227, with R. Vol. I, pp. 924-932. Besides the missing pages and 
some handwritten notations, the Smith Affidavit from IDWR's records and the Smith Affidavit 
from the SRBA main case records are identical. Id 
Both copies of the Smith Affidavit state that "A Second Round Service of 
Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1 (Second Round Notice) was prepared pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4) and is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by this reference." 
R. Vol. I, pp. 216, 925 ( emphasis in original). It appears that the Smith Affidavit from the SRBA 
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main case file was intended to include Exhibit A, but for reasons unknown those pages are 
missmg. 
However, even if pages were lost in the transmission of the Smith Affidavit from IDWR 
to the District Court in June 2005, it would not change the second-round service notice actually 
received by the Edens. The Smith Affidavit lists the Edens as persons who were mailed the 
Second-Round Service Notice. R. Vol. I, pp. 223, 928. IDWR is the entity charged with 
circulating first and second-round service. Idaho Code§ 42-1408. IDWR's records show that 
the Second-Round Service Notice included in the Record at pages 219 through 222 was the 
notice mailed out in Basin 37, Part 1. See R. Vol. I, pp. 207, 215-22. The Edens never disputed 
this fact before the District Court. IDWR records also indicate that the Edens, in fact, received 
by certified mail the Second-Round Service Notice on May 6, 2005. R. Vol. I, pp. 223,228. 
Any error in transmitting the Smith Affidavit from IDWR to the SRBA District Court did not 
affect the notice served on the Edens and is irrelevant to the determination of whether the Edens 
received due process. 
Additionally, Idaho Code§ 42-1408(5) states that "[t]he director shall file with the 
district court such proof of service as may be required to demonstrate compliance" with the 
requirements in Idaho Code§ 42-1408(1)-(4). There is no express statutory requirement that an 
affidavit filed with the court include a copy of the second-round service notice circulated to meet 
this requirement. Even if a copy of the second-round service notice was not attached to the 
Smith Affidavit, paragraph 3 of the Smith Affidavit independently verifies that the second-round 
notice was served upon all persons listed in Exhibit B. R. Vol. I, pp. 216, 925. The Edens do not 
provide any argument beyond conclusory statements as to why an affidavit of service of second-
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round notice must include a copy of the notice circulated to meet the requirements of Idaho Code 
§ 42-1408(5).13 See Appellants' Br. at 18-19. 
The Edens are attempting to raise new issues on appeal and to support those issues with 
evidence that was not before the District Court in this proceeding. The Edens had an opportunity 
to raise these issues below and give the State an opportunity to address these factual contentions 
regarding the Smith Affidavit. They did not. They cannot now raise these issues for the first time 
on appeal and attempt to overturn the District Court's Order based on evidence and legal 
theories the District Court did not consider. 
2. The District Court Did Not Err in Ruling That the Edens' Belief That 
They Properly Filed a Claim in the SRBA Was Unreasonable. 
"This Court has long accepted that water rights adjudications present unique 
circumstances, often requiring a departure from established rules of procedure." Basin-Wide 
Issue 3, 128 Idaho 246,254, 912 P.2d 614, 622 (1995). It is for this reason that the Legislature 
developed the specific procedural rules for stream adjudications in chapter 14, title 42, Idaho 
Code, including the notice procedures set forth in Idaho Code§ 42-1408. Id. at 255, 912 P.2d at 
623. As the Edens recognize on appeal, this Court has previously held that the notice procedures 
utilized in the SRBA meet constitutional due process requirements. Appellants' Br. at 20; LU 
Ranching Co. v. United States, 138 Idaho 606, 608-10, 67 P.3d 85, 87-89 (2003). "Any person 
who fails to submit a required notice of claim shall be deemed to have been constructively served 
with notice of a general adjudication by publication and mailing as required by section 42-1408, 
Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 42-1409(5). It was uncontroverted in the proceeding before the 
13 The Edens also appear to argue that the Smith Affidavit from IDWR's records does not meet 
the requirements ofldaho Code§ 42-1408(5) because Exhibit A and Exhibit Bare not labeled. 
Appellants' Br. at 18-19. This issue was also not raised before the District Court. Additionally, 
such an argument is unavailing because while the individual exhibits are not labeled, the nature 
of the exhibits are plain from their description in the Smith Affidavit. R. Vol. I, pp. 216, 925. 
The failure to label the exhibits does not render the affidavit of service inadequate. 
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District Court that the Edens personally received both first and second-round service. R. Vol. I. 
pp.223,228,377-78, 757-58. 
At the District Court, the Edens alleged that the Second-Round Service Notice they 
received led them down the wrong path. According to the Edens, due process required IDWR to 
inform them that sending "documentation" with their change of address form was not sufficient 
to file a claim in the SRBA. R. Vol. I, pp. 266. The Edens' alleged that their belief that they 
properly filed a claim in SRBA "was reasonable in view of their receipt of the Second Round 
Service Notice, stating that, 'Assistance in filing Notices of Claims filed in this adjudication may 
be obtained at all offices ofIDWR' and that 'Notices of Claims must be filed on forms prepared 
by IDWR or a reasonable facsimile."' Id. (emphasis in original). The Edens' arguments on this 
issue mirror those presented at the District Court--except for the Edens' curious allegation on 
appeal that they did not, in fact, receive the Second Round Service Notice that they purport led 
them to believe they had properly filed a claim. Appellants' Br. at 28-30. 
The District Court held that "[i]t is unreasonable to believe that sending miscellaneous 
enclosures to the Department concerning a water right is sufficient to claim that right in an 
adjudication." R. Vol. I, p. 379. Specifically, the District Court concluded that the Edens' belief 
was unreasonable both as a matter of fact, because the Edens were put on notice of the proper 
procedure for filing claims and that no claim had been filed for water right no. 37-864, and as a 
matter of law, because any such belief was contrary the statutory requirements for filing claims. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 377-80. 
The District Court found that the Edens did not comply with the instructions for 
submitting a claim as provided in the Second-Round Service Notice. R. Vol. I, pp. 378-79. 
Specifically, the District Court reasoned that the Edens did not submit a Notice of Claim on the 
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required form "[n]or have they established they submitted a reasonable facsimile" because no 
evidence was presented as to what the Edens allegedly sent. R. Vol. I, pp. 379, 379 n.4. 
Additionally, it was undisputed that the Edens did not include the required filing fee. Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 13 Ls. 10-17; R. Vol. I, p. 229. As found by the District Court, the Second-Round Service 
Notice specifically informed the Edens that they must submit the appropriate filing fee with their 
Notice of Claim. R. Vol. I, p. 379; see also R. Vol. I, p. 220 ("Failure to pay the fee will result in 
rejection of the Notice of Claim."). 
The District Court also concluded that the Edens received notice that they had not 
properly filed a claim for water right no. 37-864 because it was listed as an unclaimed right in 
the Deadline Order. R. Vol. I, p. 379. As stated in the Deadline Order, "[c]laimants should 
examine Exhibit 1 to determine whether the listed water right numbers are active water rights. 
The burden of determining whether to file a motion for late claim for any of the listed water right 
numbers rests solely with the water right holder." R. Vol. I, p. 7. The Edens were parties to the 
SRBA, as they owned at least one water right that had been decreed in their name. R. Vol. I, p. 
709. Therefore, as found by the District Court, the Edens were put on notice of the issuance of 
the Deadline Order when it was included on the SRBA Docket Sheet. R. Vol. I., p. 379 n.7, 
114 7. "Compliance with the Docket Sheet Procedure constitutes notice to all parties to the 
adjudication." R. Vol. I, p. 888 (AOJ § 6(f)(3)(b)). 
Second, the District Court concluded that the Edens' belief that they properly filed a 
claim was unreasonable because it was contrary to the law. R. Vol. I, p. 3 79. As found by the 
District Court, Idaho Code § 42-1409 requires all water right owners to file a notice of claim that 
meets specified requirements, including that the claimant, "solemnly swear or affirm under 
penalty of perjury that the statements contained in the notice of claim ... are true and correct." 
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R. Vol. I, p. 379-80; Idaho Code§ 42-1409(3). Idaho Code§ 42-1414 further instructs that each 
claimant must file the appropriate filing fee. R. Vol. I, p. 3 79. Sending random documentation 
without the required fee does not meet the statutory requirements for filing a claim in the SRBA; 
therefore, as the District Court correctly concluded, the Edens' belief that they filed a claim was 
unreasonable. See Wash. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 
913, 917, 865 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1993) ("ignorance of the law or rules of procedure are generally 
inexcusable"); State v. Lawrence, 70 Idaho 422,426,220 P.2d 380,382 (1950) ("all persons are 
presumed to know the law"). 
The District Court also correctly concluded that due process did not require IDWR to 
personally inform the Edens that they failed to properly file a claim. R. Vol. I, p. 380. Once the 
notice requirements in Idaho Code§ 42-1408 are satisfied, the burden is on the water right 
holder to properly file a water right claim in compliance with the law. Id.; see also Idaho Code § 
42-1409(4)-(6). As the District Court reasoned: 
The [Edens'] argument attempts to shift the responsibility for filing claims to the 
Department. The fact that they did not receive a response from the Department to 
the enclosures they sent it has no legal significance in the context of due process 
of law. Due process of law was satisfied in this case when the [Edens] and their 
predecessors received first and second round service notice. These notices gave 
the [Edens] notice of the adjudication as well as the applicable filing 
requirements. It was then their burden, having received first and second round 
notice, to make sure they filed a claim with the Department that complied with 
applicable filing requirements. 
R. Vol. I, p. 380. 
On appeal, the Edens do not address the reasoning of the District Court or identify in 
what manner they believed the District Court erred. See Appellants' Br. at 27-30. For the 
reasons set forth above, the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and 
its conclusions were supported by the law. Therefore, the District Court did not error in 
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concluding that due process did not require IDWR to notify the Edens that sending 
"documentation" with their change of address form was insufficient to file a claim in the SRBA. 
3. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding That Due Process Did Not 
Require That the Edens Be Personally Served With Three-Days' Notice 
of the Closure Order. 
The Edens allege that their right to due process was violated because they were not 
personally served with notice of the District Court's issuance of the Closure Order, which 
expressly decreed water right no. 37-864 disallowed. Appellants' Br. at 23-27. In support of 
this contention, the Edens rely on I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Id. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) provides that "[i]fthe 
party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, 
that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 3 
days before the hearing."14 
The District Court correctly concluded that Rule 55(b)(2) only applies to default 
judgments, and "[t]he disallowal of an unclaimed water right in a general adjudication is not a 
default judgment." R. Vol. I, p. 380. As the District Court reasoned, "[s]uch a disallowal is not 
entered pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 55," but rather, "the disallowal is entered 
pursuant to, and by operation of, statute." R. Vol. I, p. 380. Unless expressly exempted, the 
result of failing to file a required notice of claim for a water right in the SRBA is a dete1mination 
that the water right is lost. Idaho Code§ 42-1420; see also Idaho Code§ 42-1408(1)(c). The 
Edens were expressly put on notice of this requirement in the Second Round Service Notice: 
"FAILURE TO FILE A REQUIRED NOTICE OF CLAIM WILL RESULT IN A 
DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT THE WATER RIGHT NO LONGER 
EXISTS." R. Vol. I, p. 219. 
14 As noted by the Edens, there have been some changes to the language in Rule 55 since 2012. 
See Appellants' Br. at 37-38. However, the substantive requirements of the applicable provision 
appear to be the same as the current rule. Id. 
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On appeal, the Edens argue that this Court has previously ruled that the SRBA District 
Court must comply with notice procedures in I.R.C.P. 55(b). Appellants' Br. at 24-26 (citing 
Basin-Wide Issue 3, 128 Idaho 246, 912 P.2d 614 (1995)). This is inaccurate. 
In Basin-Wide Issue 3, the Court addressed, in part, the provision in Idaho Code§ 42-
1411 ( 4) providing that a water right shall be decreed as reported in the director's report if no 
objections are filed. Basin-Wide Issue 3, 128 Idaho at 258, 912 P.2d at 626. This Court held that 
this provision is in conflict with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the constitutional authority of 
the courts because it "removes the authority of the courts to apply the facts to the law and render 
a conclusion." Id. This Court went on to reason: 
Id. 
The procedure to be followed by the district court where no objection has been 
raised is established by the rules for entering a default judgment in civil actions, 
set out in I.R.C.P. 55. In addition to providing for the entry of judgment by 
default, that Rule retains in the district court the inherent power to apply law to 
facts and render a decision. 
Nothing in the Court's decision in Basin-Wide Issue 3, however, requires the SRBA 
District Court to apply the notice provisions in I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) when issuing an order closing 
claims taking and decreeing unclaimed water rights disallowed. In fact, in Basin-Wide Issue 3, 
the Court recognized "that water rights adjudications present unique circumstances, often 
requiring a departure from established rules of procedure." Id. at 254, 912 P.2d at 622. As this 
Court stated: "When the SRBA was authorized by statute in 1986, no reasonable method of ... 
providing notice to potential claimants ... was provided by the existing Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Id. at 255, 912 P.2d at 623. It was for this reason that the Legislature had to provide 
for the special first and second-round notice procedures in Idaho Code§ 42-1408. See id. 
As this Court later concluded in LU Ranching, when considering due process 
requirements in a general stream adjudication "[t]he most significant factor ... is the sheer 
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multitude of the parties to the adjudication." 138 Idaho at 610, 67 P.3d at 89 (quoting In re 
Rights to the Use of Gila River, 830 P.2d 442,453 (1992)). In such cases, "a requirement of 
personal service would be too onerous, impractical and confusing in its employment, defeating 
any purpose for meaningful notice." Id. (quoting In re Rights to the Use of Gila River, 830 P.2d 
at 453). 
For this reason, the Court gave leave for the SRBA District Court "to modify the 
procedure for making service of pleadings, motions, notices of hearing and other documents." 
Basin-Wide Issue 3, 128 Idaho at 251, 912 P.2d at 619. Under this authority, the SRBA District 
Court issuedAOJ, which set forth the SRBA Docket Sheet Procedures. AOJ does provide that 
"[t]he litigation of the SRBA will be governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), 
Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E.) and the Idaho Appellate Rules (I.A.R.)." R. Vol. I, p. 877 (AOJ 
§ l(a)). However, the procedures set forth in AO I supplement those procedures, "to the extent 
necessary to allow for the fair and expeditious resolution of all claims or issues in the SRBA." 
Id. (AOJ § l(b)). Additionally, the "[p]rovisions setting forth the matter of service and notice 
[were] adopted under the authority granted by Supplemental Order Granting Additional Powers 
to District Judge, Idaho S. Ct. 99143 (February 20, 1988)." Id. (AOJ § l(c)); see also Basin-
Wide Issue 3, 128 Idaho at 251, 912 P.2d at 619. 
Notice of the District Court's issuance of the Deadline Order, Closure Order, and Final 
Unified Decree were made pursuant to the SRBA Docket Sheet Procedure in AO I § 6. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 114 7, 1168, 1179. As the Edens were parties to the SRBA, having at least one water right 
decreed in their name, the Edens were on notice of the Court's issuance of these orders. R. Vol. 
I, p. 888 (AOJ § 6(f)(3)(b)). If the Edens wished to be personally served with the Docket Sheets, 
they had the same option as every other party in the SRBA to subscribe to the Docket Sheet by 
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paying a nominal fee. R. Vol. I, pp 887 (AOJ § 6(d)); LU Ranching, 138 Idaho at 610, 67 P.3d at 
89. 
Personally serving three-days' notice to all persons with water rights decreed disallowed 
in the Closure Order would not have been practicable. There were over two thousand water 
rights that were unclaimed in the applicable basins that were expressly decreed disallowed in the 
Closure Order. R. Vol. I, 120-205. Additionally, where no notice of claim had been filed for 
those water rights, ascertaining all persons who potentially needed to be served with the notice 
would have been overly onerous and burdensome for the District Court. IDWR already went 
through the onerous process of attempting to notify potential owners of unclaimed rights of the 
need to file claims in the second-round service process. See Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4); R. Vol. I, 
p. 216. Requiring personal service three days before the Closure Order was issued would have 
amounted to a reissuance of second-round service, involving "a flood of paper that would do no 
more than what is done by existing procedures." See LU Ranching, 138 Idaho at 610, 67 P.3d at 
89. 
Even if Rule 55(b)(2) did apply, it would only require three-days' notice to be given 
when a party appeared in the action either personally or through a representative. I.C.R.P. 
55(b)(2). The Edens argue that they should be considered to have appeared in the SRBA as 
owners of water right no. 37-864 because of the enclosures sent in with their change of address 
form or because they had received a partial decree for another water right in the SRBA. 
Appellants' Br. at 26. 
In normal civil actions, "[a]n appearance triggering the requirement of the three-day 
notice has been broadly defined and conducted on the part of the defendant which indicates an 
intent to defend against the action an appearance within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. 
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Transp. Tire Co. Inc., 107 Idaho 602,606,691 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984). However, this broad 
definition is not without limitations: "[T]he defendant's actions 'must be responsive to plaintiffs 
formal [c]ourt action,' so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the dispute or to 
communicate to the plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief." Meyers v. 
Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,288,221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) (quoting Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 
349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975)). There has not been an appearance merely because the plaintiff knew 
the defendant intended to resist the suit. Baez, 518 F.2d at 350. 
Under the circumstances presented, the Edens should not be considered as having 
appeared as owners of water right no. 37-864 in the SRBA. First, the fact that the Edens own 
another water right that was decreed in the SRBA does not relate to whether the Edens appeared 
in the SRBA as owners of water right no. 37-864. Owning one decreed water right does not 
establish whether the Edens owned other water rights and whether they would pursue claims to 
those rights. Second, the Edens' allegation that they sent unknown documentation to IDWR 
sometime in 2005 is not enough to establish that the Edens appeared in the SRBA as owners of 
water right no. 37-864. 
Once ownership of water right no. 37-864 was transferred to the Edens in 1992, the 
burden was on them (1) to ascertain whether a claim had been filed for that water right and file a 
claim if none had been filed and (2) to file with IDWR a notice of transfer of ownership form. 
Idaho Code§ 42-1409(6). The Edens failed to meet this burden in both respects. It is 
uncontroverted that neither the Edens nor their predecessors in interest filed a notice of claim in 
the SRBA for water right no. 37-864. Additionally, the Edens failed to provide IDWR with 
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notice of a transfer in ownership for water right no. 37-864. 15 When the Deadline Order and the 
Closure Order were issued, the owner ofrecord for water right no. 37-864 was Anthony M. 
Gomes. R. Vol. I, pp. 54, 150. The Record indicates that as late as 2015, IDWR had not 
received a notice of change of ownership form from the Edens for water right no. 37-864. R. 
Vol. I, p. 356. 
In a normal civil case, when a defendant attempts to appear in action, who the defendant 
is and their interest in the litigation are apparent. The same is not true where a potential claimant 
does not properly file a water right claim in a general stream adjudication and does not take the 
statutorily mandated steps to ensure that IDWR has up to date information on the ownership of 
specific water rights. 
Idaho Code§ 42-1409(6) mandates that purchasers of water rights exercise a certain level 
of diligence. The Edens did not meet their statutory burden to file a claim or to provide IDWR 
with the required information as to their ownership interest in water right no. 37-864. Therefore, 
they should not be considered to have appeared as owners of water right no. 37-864 in the SRBA 
and trigger any alleged requirement that the SRBA District Court provide them with personal 
service of the order decreeing that water right disallowed. 
For the forgoing reasons, the District Court correctly concluded that due process did not 
require the Edens to be personally served with three days' notice of the Closure Order decreeing 
water right no. 37-864 disallowed. 16 
15 It is unclear why the Edens' did not file a notice of transfer of ownership form for water right 
no. 37-864 when they had filed such forms for other water rights. R. Vol. I, pp. 318-22. 
16 In order to state a claim for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), the Edens must show that "the 
judgment is void." As this Court has previously stated, the failure to deliver three-days' notice 
under Rule 55(b)(2) renders a judgment merely voidable-not void. Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288, 
221 P.3d at 86. Even if the Court were to rule that the Edens appeared in the SRBA and should 
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Edens' 
Motion to Set Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order Under 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). 
Under Rule 60(b)(6), a district court may set aside a final judgment or order for "any other 
reason that justifies relief." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) "may be granted 
only on a showing of 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief." Berg v. Kendall, 
147 Idaho 571,578,212 P.3d 1001, 1008 (2009) (quoting Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 
924 P.2d 607,611 (1996)). Additionally, I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) are mutually 
exclusive, "such that a ground for relief asserted, falling fairly under 60(b )( 1 ), cannot be granted 
under 60(b)(6)." LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158, 163, 953 P.2d 598,603 (1998) (quoting 
Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 37 n.2, 592 P.2d 849, 852 n.2 (1979)). 
On appeal, the Edens allege that their "attempt to file the Notice of Claim for 3 7-864 and 
their failure to receive the May 19, 2005, IDWR response, due to IDWR's use of an incorrect 
mailing address ... certainly together constitute 'unique and compelling circumstances,' 
justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." Appellants' Br. at 30-31. The Edens do not address the 
District Court's reasoning for denying their motion or in what manner they believe the District 
Court erred. 
The District Court correctly concluded that the Edens were impermissibly attempting to 
disguise a Rule 60(b )(1) motion as a Rule 60(b )( 6) motion to get around the time limitations in 
Rule 60(c)(l). R. Vol. I, p. 381. In essence, the Edens' argument before the District Court was 
that they mistakenly believed that they had filed a claim in the SRBA by sending unknown 
have personally received three-days' notice before the Closure Order was issued, that by itself 
would not render the Closure Order and Final Unified Decree void. The Edens would have to 
establish that the failure to be personally served with three-days' notice amounted to "a plain 
usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." Id. at 291,221 P.3d at 89 (citation 
omitted). The Edens have offered no argument as to why the failure to receive three-days' notice 
of the Closure Order, ifrequired, would be a violation of due process. For the reasons set forth 
above, it would not. 
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"documentation" with their change of address letter. See R. Vol. I, pp. 260-270. Such an 
allegation of mistake would usually fall within the purview of Rule 60(b)(l), which allows a 
judgment to be set aside based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l). However, a motion under Rule 60(b)(l) must be filed "no more than 6 months 
after the entry of the judgment or order." LR. C.P. 60( c )(1 ). When the Edens' Motion to Set 
Aside was filed on September 30, 2016, it had been well past six months since the Closure Order 
was issued on February 13, 2013. 17 As the District Court concluded, allowing the Edens' motion 
to go forward under Rule 60(b)(6) would be allowing the Edens to circumvent the time 
limitations in Rule 60(c)(l). R. Vol. I, p. 381. 
Moreover, the Edens failed to show unique and compelling circumstances that warrant 
setting aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order. The intended result of the SRBA 
was a decree determining all water rights in the Snake River Basin, which would allow for the 
creation of an accurate schedule of water rights for delivery in times of shortage. R. Vol. I, p. 
715. "By statute, 'decree[s] entered in a general adjudication shall be conclusive as to the nature 
and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system."' City of Blaclifoot v. Spackman, 
No. 44207, 2017 WL 2644703, at *4 (June 20, 2017) (quoting Idaho Code§ 42-1420(1)). This 
is an essential aspect of the SRBA, as "[f]inality in water rights is essential." Id. (quoting State 
v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 12, 16,951 P.2d 943,947 (1998)). 
Setting aside an order disallowing a water right and allowing a late claim to proceed after 
the Final Unified Decree has been issued would impact the finality of the over 158,600 water 
17 The Final Unified Decree states that "[t]he time period for determining forfeiture of a partial 
decree based upon state law shall be measured from the date of issuance of the partial decree by 
this Court and not from the date of this Final Unified Decree." R. Vol. I, p. 944. Even if the 
time period was to start from the time the Final Unified Decree was issued on August 26, 2014, 
the Edens' motion would still be untimely. 
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rights that were properly claimed, adjudicated, and decreed during the pendency of the SRBA. 
· See Ann Y. Vonde et al., Understanding the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 
53, 56 (2016). As this Court has previously stated, "by reason of the interlocking of adjudicated 
rights on any stream system, any order or action affecting one right affects all such rights." In re 
Snake River Basin Water Sys., 115 Idaho 1, 7, 764 P.2d 78, 84 (1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 755, 
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4-6 (1951)). "Each water rights claim by its 'very nature raise[s] issues 
inter se as to all such parties for the determination of one claim necessarily affects the amount 
available for the other claims."' Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 140, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 
2923, 77 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1983) (quoting City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 180 P.2d 699, 715 
(Cal. App. 1947)). 
The Edens received the same notice as all other potential claimants in the SRBA. 
Although the Edens received both first and second-round service, which instructed them on how 
to properly file claims, they failed to follow such instructions. Additionally, there is no 
indication that the Edens took any steps to protect their interest in water right no. 37-864 in 
between the time they allegedly sent documentation to IDWR and filing the instant motions. The 
Edens were familiar with the SRBA, as they owned at least one water right that was decreed. R. 
Vol. I, pp. 316-17, 709. It is unclear how the Edens could have reasonably thought that water 
right no. 37-864 was properly claimed in the SRBA when, unlike their other water right, they 
never received a partial decree. Additionally, the Edens were put on notice that no claim had 
been filed for water right no. 37-864 by the SRBA District Court's issuance of the Deadline 
Order, Closure Order, and the Final Unified Decree, all of which expressly listed water right no. 
3 7-864 as unclaimed, and for that reason expressly decreed disallowed. R. Vol. I, pp. 17, 54, 
112-13, 150,943,956, 1147, 1168, 1179. 
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The foregoing does not present unique and compelling circumstances that warrant setting 
aside the Final Unified Decree and Closure Order so the Edens may now file a late claim in the 
SRBA. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Edens' Rule 
60(b )( 6) motion. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying the Edens' Motion to File a Late 
Notice of Claim. 
The Edens request that "if on appeal, this Court determines that at least one of the Rule 
60(b) grounds for setting aside the Partial Decree is satisfied, the District Court's ruling as to the 
Motion to File Late Notice of Claim also should be overturned. " Appellants' Br. at 31. 
In its Order, the District Court correctly ruled that "[s]ince the Movants have failed to set 
forth sufficient grounds under Rule 60(b) to set aside the Court Documents their Motion to File a 
Late Notice of Claim must be denied." R. Vol. I, p. 381. As no claim for water right no. 37-864 
was filed during the pendency of the SRBA, it was expressly decreed disallowed as was required 
under Idaho Code§ 42-1420. The Final Unified Decree is "conclusive as to the nature and 
extent of all water rights within the Snake River Basin within the State of Idaho with a priority 
date prior to November 19, 1987." R. Vol. I, p. 941; Idaho Code§ 42-1420(1). All prior water 
rights that were required to be claimed in the SRBA were superseded by the Final Unified 
Decree. R. Vol. I, p. 944. The Closure Order and the Final Unified Decree conclusively ruled 
that water right no. 37-864 no longer exists. Thus, in order to file a late Notice of Claim for 
water right no. 37-864, the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order would have to be set 
aside. For the reasons discussed above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the Edens' Motion to Set Aside the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order. The District 
Court, therefore, also did not error in denying the Edens' Motion to File a Late Notice of Claim. 
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If the Court determines that the Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order should be 
set aside, this proceeding should be remanded to the District Court to determine in the first 
instance whether a Late Notice of Claim should proceed under I.R.C.P. 55( c ). Motions to file a 
Late Notice of Claim are reviewed under the criteria in I.R.C.P. 55(c). R. Vol. I, p. 883 (AOJ 
§ 4(d)(2)(d)). I.R.C.P. 55(c) provides that a court may set aside an entry of default "for good 
cause." Whether good cause exists under Rule 55(c) is a discretionary decision to be made by 
the trial court. AgStar Fin. Servs., ACA v. Gordon Paving Co., Inc., 161 Idaho 817,819,391 
P.3d 1287, 1289 (2017). 
Although the matter should not be considered for the first time on appeal, the State would 
note that it disagrees with the Edens' assertion that allowing the late claim to proceed would not 
prejudice other water users in the Snake River Basin. See Appellants' Br. at 32-33. There has 
been a long standing water shortage in Basin 37, and a moratorium on new consumptive rights 
has been in place since 1993. R. Vol. I, pp. 326-32. Allowing the Edens to assert a claim to a 
water right disallowed in the adjudication would prejudice junior water users by reducing the 
amount of legally available water and by allowing a new senior to assert priority. 
Allowing a new claim to be filed in the SRBA after the Final Unified Decree has been 
issued would also undermine the finality of the over 158,600 water rights that were timely 
claimed, adjudicated, and decreed. Water users in the Snake River Basin must be able to rely on 
the finality of the decree that concluded the twenty-seven year general stream adjudication. The 
Edens argue that other parties to the SRBA will not be impacted because the Final Unified 
Decree would only be opened up "as to its effect on Water Right No. 37-864." Appellants' Br. 
at 33. This argument, however, fails to recognize the interrelation between water rights within 
the same water system. It is this interrelation that spurred the initiation of general stream 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 35 
adjudications such as the SRBA. "Each water rights claim by its 'very nature raise[s] issues inter 
se as to all such parties for the determination of one claim necessarily affects the amount 
available for the other claims."' Nevada, 463 U.S. at 140 (quoting City of Pasadena, 180 P.2d at 
715). 
Additionally, as the District Court stated, "[t]he process for adjudicating a late claim is a 
lengthy process even if the claim is ultimately uncontested." R. Vol. I, p. 382. "A motion to file 
a late claim must generally comply with docket sheet notice procedure. If granted, the 
Department must investigate the claim and file a director's report and provide a period of time 
for objections and responses. If the Department's recommendation is contested the process can 
take much longer." Id. Allowing the Late Notice of Claim to proceed, therefore, would not have 
the insignificant impact argued by the Edens. See Appellants' Br. at 32-33. 
D. The State Is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal Under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
The State requests an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant Idaho 
Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and Idaho Code§ 12-121 because the Edens' pursuit of this appeal 
was unreasonable, frivolous, and without foundation. A substantial portion of the Edens' 
briefing on appeal is devoted to legal theories that were not raised at the District Court. 
Appellants' Br. at 16-22. It is well established that an appellant is bound by the legal theories 
raised before the district comi and may not challenge the district court's decision based on legal 
theories raised for the first time on appeal. Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 47,394 P.3d 87, 90 
(2017). 
Moreover, where the Edens do address the issues actually raised in the proceeding below, 
they merely reiterate the arguments made before the District Court without adding additional 
analysis or even addressing the District Court's analysis. Appellants' Br. at 23-31. This Court 
has previously held that an award of attorney fees on appeal was warranted under Idaho Code 
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§ 12-121 where the non-prevailing party "continued to rely on the same arguments used in front 
of the district court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the 
existing law on which the district court based its decision." Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 
320,385 P.3d 856, 875 (2016) (quoting Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419, 
424 (2005)). 
The Edens have failed to raise a legitimate challenge to the District Court's decision. For 
this reason, the State requests that it be awarded its costs and attorney fees incmTed in defending 
against this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affam the SRBA 
District Court's Order and that the State be awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of July 2017. 
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